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One major issue in the accomplishment of contrasts in conversation is lexical 
choice of items which carry the semantic load of the two States of affair which are 
represented as being opposed to one another. These items or expressions are 
co-selected to be understood as being contrastively related to each other. In this 
paper, it is argued that the activity of contrasting itself provides them with a 
specific local opposite meaning which they would not obtain in other contexts. 
Practices of contrasting are thus seen as an example of conversational activities 
which creatively and systematically affect situated meanings. Based on data from 
various genres, such as meetings, mediation sessions and conversations, the 
paper discusses two practices of contrasting, their sequential construction and 
their interpretative effects. It is concluded that the interpretative effects of 
conversational contrasting rest on the sequential deployment of linguistic 
resources and on the cognitive procedures of frame-based interpretation and 
constructing a maximally contrastive interpretation for the co-selected 
expressions.
l. Lntroduction
Contrast is one o f the most fundamental semantic relations between lexical items. 
While lexical semantics conceives o f contrasts as structural sense relations which hold 
context-ffee, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and interactional linguistics are 
interested in how contrasts are achieved in discourse by participants’ work. Research 
so far has mainly focused on the sequential organization of contrasts, their prosody 
and their discursive functions and inferential properties. Another major issue in the 
accomplishment o f contrasts in conversation is lexical choice -  the choice o f words 
and phrases which are contrasted and which carry the semantic load o f the two States 
of affair that are represented as being opposed to one another. These items, however, 
are only rarely related to one another in terms of lexico-semantic contrast (such as 
small vs. large; buy vs. seil). But how does lexical choice then relate to activities o f con-
trasting? In this paper, I argue that activities o f contrasting often affect the currently 
relevant interpretation of the contrasted lexical items. It can provide them with a lo-
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cal meaning which they would not obtain in other contexts. To be more specific, the 
activity of contrasting suggests an interpretation of the contrasted words as local op- 
posites. This most prominently involves that semantic and inferential properties which 
are locally contingent on the first of the contrasted items are negated or corrected by 
the second one. Contrasting thus focuses on and defocuses specific semantic aspects, 
it instructs the selection among and the inference to local interpretations, and it leads 
to the ad hoc construction of local taxonomic relations. In this way, activities of con-
trasting can provide lexical items with a local meaning which, by repeated, routine 
use, may be strongly associated with them. It can become part of their meaning po-
tential and can therefore also be deployed in other, non-contrastive contexts of use. 
After a short review of research on contrasts and contrasting (Section 2) and a note on 
data and method (Section 3), I will discuss two practices of conversational contrast-
ing which differ in their sequential and functional organization as well as in aspects of 
their semantic impact on the contrasted words (Sections 4 and 5). Building on these 
analyses, I will claim that there are two interpretive strategies which participants use 
for the local specification of word-meanings by activities o f contrasting: frame-based 
interpretation and maximization of contrast (Section 6).
2. Approaches to contrasting
Contrast is one o f the main topics of structural lexical semantics (e.g. Cruse 1986; 
Lyons 1977). It is studied as one paradigmatic property ofthe relation between lexical 
items as such. The relation of contrast holds for any two lexical items which can be 
mapped onto a common semantic dimension and which
-  simply exclude one another (incompatibility: M onday vs. Tuesday)\
-  inhabit polar positions on a dimensional scale ((polar) antonymy: hot vs. cold);
-  divide a common dimension into two sections and negatively imply one another 
(complementarity: dead  vs. alive);
-  denote states or processes which are spatially or temporally opposed to one an-
other (perspectivai conversion: before vs. afier), reciprocai actions or roles in ac- 
tion sequences (e.g. buy vs. se//), or opposing directions and actions (directional 
conversion: come vs. go; restitutives: gain vs. waste).
Although some structuralists concede that there may be some “contextual modula- 
tion” (Cruse 1986:51ff.), which modifies the meaning of an item, the specification of 
meaning in contexts o f use is no essential concern for them and is not systematically 
accounted for in their semantic models. The lexicon is conceived of as an inven- 
tory o f static, context-free relations. Accordingly, contrast is a sense-relation between 
decontextualized items. Structuralists do not ask what conversationalists themselves 
mark and treat as contrasting. Activities o f contrasting and their interpretation in real 
interactional contexts are not considered as the proper object o f semantic study. Con- 
sequently, effects o f discursive activities on the semantics o f individual lexical items are
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not taken into account. Therefore, this view cannot provide for systematic origins of 
polysemy and semantic change.1
Studies in syntax and text linguistics inquire into contrast as a relation which holds 
between propositions. It is expressed by clauses or sentences (e.g. Rudolph 1996), or, 
more generally, exists between segments o f texts (Mann 8c Thompson 1992). Although 
most studies focus on the propositional level, contrasts can also be established on the 
epistemic or speech act level (Sweetser 1990), and even on the textual level. In syn- 
tactic, text and interactional linguistic studies, definitions o f contrast ränge ffom very 
restrictive conceptions to a notion of 'contrast’ as a super-category for a variety of 
more specific relations (see e.g. Mann 8c Thompson 1992; Rudolph 1996).
In this paper, a rather broad conception of ‘contrast’ as a cover-term will be 
adopted: Following Barth-Weingarten (2003:39), “contrast is understood here as a 
general term for all kinds o f relations which in some way express an Opposition be-
tween items of one sort or another.” This definition neither unduly restricts the size 
o f discursive segments to be contrasted nor makes any premature suppositions about 
linguistic means, the level and semantic features o f the contrast. This wide definition 
of contrast’ includes more specific concepts that are well known:
-  Adversativity: In its dialogical realization, adversativity is prototypically realized 
by a first speaker making a claim which a second Speaker straightforwardly objects 
to (ex.: A: “People told me you were at home.” B: “But not at that time.”)
-  Neutral contrast does not involve a preference for one part o f the contrasted items, 
but “two items are said to be in contrast if they are comprehended to be the same 
in many respects, comprehended as differing in a few respects, compared with 
respect to one or more of these differences” (Mann 8c Thompson 1992:37; ex.: 
A: “Yesterday, I knew the whole book by heart, but when they asked me, I didn’t 
remember anything.”).
-  Concession as a discursive-pragmatic relation is prototypically realized accord- 
ing to a tripartite ‘Cardinal Concessive Schema’ with a first Speaker making a 
claim X  which, in contrast to adversativity and neutral contrast, a second Speaker 
first concedes (X’) and then counters with Y (Couper-Kuhlen 8c Thompson 2000; 
Barth-Weingarten 2003; ex.: A: “Yesterday was a real downer.” B: “That’s true, but 
you have to learn to put up with such things.”). The concession may involve an 
irrelevant or a potential obstacle to the validity of a claim, “negated causality” 
(König 8c Siemund 2000), i.e. a cause-effect-relation does not hold in the specific 
case, or a restriction of the validity or generality o f a Statement (Gtinthner 2000).
-  Antithesis: In contradistinction to other contrastive relations, antithesis involves 
the negation of X  which is contrasted with the affirmation of Y (Thompson 8c 
Mann 1987). The Cardinal Antithesis Schema thus consists of a first Speaker mak-
ing some claim X  which a second Speaker denies and supplants with a counter- 
claim Y (ex.: A: “You have slandered me!” B: “No. It was you who slandered me!”).
Interactional linguistics is not only concerned with aspects o f formal sequential Or-
ganization and linguistic marking, but also with interactional fimctions and conse-
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quences. Ford (2000, 2001) showed that in interaction, a variety o f (adversative and 
antithetic) contrasts are treated as being in need of explanation, solution or correc- 
tion. As an exception to this, she refers to cases o f trouble-telling and authority-based 
interaction where such a treatment was not wished or not granted. Barth-Weingarten 
(2003: Ch. 5) concludes that concession in interaction may operate on the ideational, 
interpersonal and textual level. Thus, it not only serves to increase the acceptability o f a 
counter-move, but even more often establishes grounds for a disruptive (interrupting, 
topic changing etc.) move.
In conversation analysis (CA) and ethnomethodology, contrasts or contrast struc- 
tures are regarded as a routine practice for the rhetorical Organization of descriptions 
(Edwards 1997). There are, however, only few studies which explicitly focused on con-
trasts. The forms and uses o f contrasts identified are rather varied, though. Smith 
(1978) has shown how contrast structures are used to account for a person’s categoriza- 
tion as ‘mentally ilT. Here, contrasts are made up by deviations from norms of adequate 
behaviour and from action preferences established by the teller. Atkinson’s (1984) anal- 
yses of political oratory reveal how contrasts are designed as clap traps. These contrasts 
mainly rely on patterns o f repetition and Variation, both syntactically and prosodi- 
cally. Drew (1992) investigated contrasting descriptions in courtroom-examinations. 
He shows how lawyer and witness select competing categorizations o f the same events 
or behaviours. These contrasts are used as other-corrections ancf designed to make 
available competing inferences regarding motives, responsibility and guilt of the ac- 
tors in question. Building on these analyses, Edwards (1997 and 1998) highlights the 
rhetoric, situated and pragmatic design of contrasts in text and talk, especially in com- 
petitive or argumentative contexts. He claims that contrast structures are “not just a 
matter of deploying ready-made conceptual resources that are built into semantic cat-
egories, but something people can do flexibly and inventively, for just about any set 
of objects or events” (Edwards 1997:237). The thrust of Edwards’ quote runs counter 
lexico-semantic conceptions of interactional meaning: He sees the activity of present- 
ing things as contrasting as primary and as independent of lexical contrasts. Contrast 
structures in discourse neither depend on lexical givens nor do they reflect brüte, nat- 
uralistic (or experiential) facts. It is rather a pragmatically designed rhetoric move to 
organize things into binary contrasts and to present them as (the relevant, the only 
possible etc.) alternatives. Edwards’ pragmatic approach contrasts with authors who, 
in the framework of traditional semantics, have claimed that “semantic Opposition” 
(Lakoff 1971) of minimally two pairs of corresponding lexical items in X  and Y maybe 
the source of the contrast between X  and Y (see also Longacre 1983:83). Lakoff’s illus-
trative sentence John is rieh but Bill ispoor  for example involves a pair of incompatibles 
(John vs. Bill) and a pair of polar antonyms (rieh vs. poor). In this approach, seman-
tic Opposition is regarded as a lexical fact which exists prior to and independently of 
discourse and is used as a resource to build a textual (propositional) Opposition.
Lexical contrasts are not necessary to achieve discursive contrasts, although there 
are subtypes which involve semantic Opposition, one being neutral contrast (see 
above). If  a discursive contrast, however, crucially rests on a contrast between two (or
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more) corresponding lexical items, it is (at least tacitly) assumed that their contrastiv- 
ity is lexically driven, i.e., that it is given beforehand by a context-free structural rela-
tion of the items. Their contrastivity would thus only be used in talk-in-interaction, 
but not established by talk-in-interaction itself. In this paper, however, I intend to show 
that the latter case is pervasive: It is by activities of contrasting that conversationalists 
provide pairs of lexical items or phrases with a situated, semantically contrastive in- 
terpretation which they would not obtain in isolation, i.e. without being part o f the 
discursively achieved contrast structure. It will be shown that these situated meanings 
may sometimes clearly differ from established lexical meanings. The latter, however, 
need, at least to some extent, to be seen as sedimentations o f frequent activities of 
contrasting of particular lexical items in discourse.
As this selective overview of the literature already suggests, contrasting is no ho- 
mogeneous practice: Linguistic marking, sequential organization, interactional func- 
tion, level of contrast and the exact discourse-pragmatic relation of the Stretches o f talk 
that are contrasted with one another are quite manifold. It will not come as a surprise 
that practices of contrasting also differ in terms of how the local Interpretation of con-
trasted items is affected by the activity. After a short note on my data and the method of 
analysis (Section 3), I will discuss two different practices of contrasting which can pro-
vide contrasted lexical items (or phrases) with a specific, situated interpretation: One 
is “correcting a prior categorization” (Section 4), the other is “warranting a deviation- 
categorization" (Section 5). These two practices differ in their linguistic realizations, 
sequential and functional organization, and, what matters most here, they also involve 
different interpretive devices to establish the situated meaning of the contrasted items. 
At the same time, however, it will be shown that there are still more general interpretive 
strategies which are shared byboth practices (Section 6).
3. Data and method
My study on contrasts is based on a corpus covering a ränge of interactional sit- 
uations: five leisure time conversations among adolescents, one family dinner table 
conversation, one planning session for a radio show, three mediation sessions, one bi- 
ographical interview and four political lectures with discussion in public places. Thirty 
instances o f interactionally achieved contrasts were analyzed in detail. The sequential 
analysis proceeded in a conversation analytic manner, with special emphasis on the 
following issues:
-  How is a contrast achieved and displayed (syntactically, prosodically)?
-  How is it sequentially organized? When and by whom is the contrast established? 
How is it reacted to?
-  Which words or phrases are contrasted?
-  How does the contrast affect the local interpretation of the contrasted items and 
how are they semantically related to each other?
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-  Is there specific background knowledge contextualized which is relevant for the 
understanding o f the contrast?
-  What is the function of the contrast in the interactional sequence?
Since this study specifically deals with the effects o f conversational activities on the 
local interpretation of words and phrases, issues o f semantic structure and conversa-
tional inference gained major importance. It therefore became necessary to introduce 
some cognitive concepts, namely ‘background knowledge’, ‘ffame-based expectation’ 
and ‘maxims of interpretation, to account for the details of the local use and interpre-
tation of contrasts.
4-
Disaffiliative reactions, such as disagreement, objection or other-correction, pertain to 
a variety of things rnade relevant by a prior speaker’s turn, e.g. propositional content, 
opinions/assessments, lexical choice, compliance with a projected course of joint or 
next speaker’s action etc. Disaffiliation can be specifically directed to a prior speaker’s 
use of a specific word (or phrase): Next speaker displays that s/he does not accept prior 
speaker’s interpretation of the word as locally adequate. Here is an example from a 
meeting of adolescents planning a broadcast-show and discussing its contents.2 Ken 
proposes that the group should play music for half an hour; Michaela objects that the 
music should not be played in one piece:3
( 1 ) halbe stunde (broadcast meeting)
Ich würd ma sagen so halbe stunde mUsik 
I would say play about half an hour of 
auflegen- 
music-
<<ff> ja aber net am ganzen stück.>
«ff> yes but not in one piece. >
((laughs))
[zwisch=durch auch- (.) weißt schon 
[in between also- (.) you know 
(was ich mein)]
(what I mean) ]
[NEE:::; ]
[NO:::; ]
[EIJA äh ja ( ) nich so-]
[well aye ( ) not so- ]
also AUFgeteilt irgendwie, (.)










After a short agreement token, Michaela refuses a pqtential interpretation of Ken’s pro- 
posal (line 2): The music should not be played in one piece. In what follows, she dar-
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ifies her objection by formulating the interpretation of Kens proposal that she would 
accept: There had to come something (i.e. tallc) in-between (Hne 5), that is, the music 
had to be split up (aufgeteilt, line 9). There is thus the contrast between a (potential) 
continuative interpretation of halbe stunde (‘half an hour’), which Michaela rejects, 
and a discontinuative interpretation, which she favours. Ken immediately shows in 
line 8 that he accepts the discontinuative interpretation. So, the contrast achieves two 
different interpretations of halbe stunde:
a. Exposure: The contrast exposes a possible interpretation of halbe stunde as it was 
used by the prior Speaker Ken. Michaela points to the fact that halbe stunde may 
have a continuative interpretation which is not acceptable from her point o f view. 
The contrasted phrase net am  ganzen stück (‘not in one piece’) negates (inferen- 
tial) aspects o f a possible interpretation of halbe stunde as used by Ken. This is, 
net am  ganzen stück makes aspects o f the interpretation of halbe stunde explicit 
which Ken did not formulate, but which Michaela attributes to Kens (possible) 
interpretation. By rejecting a possible interpretation made available by his turn, 
Michaela suggests two alternative inferences: Either Ken must have had the inter-
pretation she objects to, or he has failed to be as precise as necessary and thus 
risked a potential misunderstanding because o f ambiguity or vagueness.
b. Correction: The contrasted item net am  ganzen stück supplants Ken’s possible con-
tinuative interpretation of halbe stunde -  which Michaela does not accept -  with a 
discontinuative interpretation (which she prefers).
In a corrective contrast-sequence, then, the adequacy4 of the use and the semantics of 
a word in a prior Speaker’s turn is at issue. A second Speaker expresses his/her rejection 
by contrasting the prior speaker’s formulation (FO) with a second formulation (CO) 
which in some aspect opposes to FO. Thus, the basic Schema is a dialogically achieved 
contrast structure:
S l: FO
S2: (FO) but CO
4.1 Asymmetrie contrast o f  perspectives and nested interpretation
The corrective contrast objects to the adequacy of a prior speaker’s formulation by 
multiplying its interpretations. There are three interpretations o f the formulation at 
issue which are involved in a dialogical corrective contrast:
a. Prior speaker’s own interpretation of FO in his/her own turn. In (1), Ken’s own 
interpretation of halbe stunde might be continuative as well as discontinuative.
b. Next speaker’s interpretation of how prior Speaker has or might have interpreted 
FO, that is, next speaker’s exposure o f a (possible) interpretation of FO. In (1), 
Michaela exposes the possible continuative interpretation of halbe stunde.
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c. Next Speakers corrective interpretation of FO, that is, next Speaker introduces a 
contrasting interpretation which s/he proposes to be more adequate. In (1), the 
next Speaker favours the discontinuative interpretation of halbe stunde by rejecting 
the continuative interpretation (aber net am  ganzen stück; ‘but not in one piece’).
(a) and (b) must be kept apart, because (b) is not a direct, but a nested represen- 
tation: Next Speakers exposition of prior speaker’s interpretation of FO may not be 
accepted by him/her as a correct rendering of his/her intentions. This phenomenon 
is well-known from arguments. In excerpt (1), Ken accepts the correction (line 8) 
and seems to concede that he could have been understood as meaning a continuative 
interpretation of halbe stunde. Formulating a corrective contrast to a prior speaker’s 
formulation is not only a way of (re-)specifying its meaning; it is also a way of express- 
ing a (supposed) contrast o f participants’ perspectives. The activity o f contrasting here 
creates two discursively relevant mental spaces (cf. Fauconnier 1985) which contain 
different readings of the target formulation -  next speaker’s own interpretation and 
his/her alter-representation of prior speaker’s interpretation. These two interpreta- 
tions are asymmetrically ordered with respect to the interactional process and to their 
evaluation. While the alter-representation reveals a backward looking, context-bound 
(Heritage 1995) understanding of the prior turn, which is denied, next speaker’s own 
interpretation is a forward looking, context-renewing (Heritage 1995) interpretation, 
which is presented as the preferred basis for further talk. The inquiry into the seman-
tic workings o f the corrective contrast shows that the adversative or concessive relation 
‘FO but CO’ essentially hides an antithetic relation 'Not FO as understood by prior 
Speaker but FO as understood by next Speaker’ and thus an asymmetric ordering of 
conflicting perspectives.
I will present some further cases to provide an impression of the generality of cor-
rective contrasts. Excerpt (2) is from an argument between mediator and proponent 
in a mediation session.5 The mediator claims that the proponent had complained that 
her opponent’s daughter threw stones at clothes hanging in their common yard. The 
proponent denies to have made this complaint. Excerpt (2) Starts with the mediator 
insisting on the truth o f his quote by referring to the official record of the complaint. 
The proponent then tries to resolve the conflict and claims that the child threw stones, 
but did not hit clothes.
(2) schmeißt [Mediation; IDS-Mannheim ‘Schlichtung’ 3001/02]
01 Med: da ham sie awwer AUCH- (.)
there you have also- (.)
02 angegebe wie die TOCHter der Antragsgegnerin auf 
declared how the daughter of the Opponent on
03 dem <<len, überdeutlich prononciert> geMEINsamen 
the <<len, overarticulate> common
04 Wäschetrockenplatz einen stein auf die wasche
laundry drying ground '
2 97
05 + + die dort hl:ng wAr:f.> (— )
cast a stone at the clothes hanging there.> (--)
06 Pro: ja des is SO' (-)
well it is like this (-)
07 do is=n gArde- (.) 
there is a garden- (.)
08 un vielleisch=n HALwe meder 
and maybe half a meter
09 fonge die wÄschseile o:.(-) 
Starts the clothes-line. (-)
10 ++ also steht se im garde drin un ISCHMEXßTS- (--) 
so she Stands in the garden and throws- (— )
11 n halwe meder weit-(-) 
half a meter- (-)
12 -*■ awwer sie hot nEt getroffe.
but she did not hit the clothes.
13 Med: =ah do [muss se ja fascht trEffe. 
=uh so [she cannot but hit.
14 Pro: [so is des bei uns.
[that's how it is at our place.
The mediator confronts the proponent with a contradiction: Before the excerpt Starts, 
the proponent denied a fact which she previously had declared to be true (cf. lines 1-  
5). The proponent tries to resolve this (alleged) contradiction by a narrative contrast 
which is designed to make explicit the semantics o f w arf (‘cast’, line 5) as cited by the 
mediator: Using present tense and deictics which are rooted in the narrated Situation, 
the proponent re-stages the process of the child throwing stones. What matters most 
to her defense and the semantics o f warf/schm eißt6 (‘cast7 ‘throws’) is that she narrates 
three successive steps of the action:
a. the source: the child Starts the action of throwing the stone (line 10);
b. the path: the stone flies half a meter (line 1 1 );
c. the goal: the stone misses the goal (line 12).
By making explicit that the stone did not reach its goal, this iconically designed narra-
tive fragment achieves
a. an exposure of the proponent’s meaning: The proponent exposes that the
mediator obviously assumes that the proponent meant an accomplishment-
interpretation, i.e. w arf (‘cast’) implies Teached its goal’;
b. the correction of the accomplishment-interpretation by a mere activity-interpreta- 
tion,7 i.e. w arf/schm eißt (‘cast’/‘throws’) for the proponent only means ‘throwing 
something with the intention of striking a goal’. The activity-interpretation of 
schmeißt ( ‘throws’) is also highlighted by the elision of the prepositional object 
a u f die wüsche (‘at the clothes’), which the mediator used in line 4. Since the goal 
of the action is omitted, the description focuses on the activity itself. So, it also 
avoids the local ambiguity between a directional interpretation of the preposi-
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tional phrase (‘toward the clothes’) and an achievement interpretation (‘hit the 
clothes’).
The corrective interpretation operates as an interpretation limiter which explicitly 
denies a semantic feature which the mediator includes in his (local) default interpre-
tation auf w arf /schmeißt (‘cast’/‘throws’). The narrative contrast, marked by awwer 
(‘but’, line 12), concedes that there is the expectation of an achievement-interpretation 
of w arf/schm eißt (‘cast’/‘throws’). This achievement-interpretation, which thç pro- 
ponent attributes to the mediator, and her correcting interpretation are iconically 
displayed as she contrasts schmeißt (‘throws’) with the (unexpected) outcome hat nEt 
getroffe ( ‘did not hit’, line 12). The mediator reacts to this Statement with a display of 
scepticism (line 13): He judges the failure to hit the clothes as most unlikely, and thus 
reinforces his expectation that the meaning of warf/schmeißt (‘cast’Tthrows’) (in this 
context) implies ‘hits the intended target’. Again, the contrast simultaneously works to 
expose implicit features of the meaning of a prior speaker’s formulation and to replace 
them with next speaker’s own corrective interpretation.
The corrective contrast is not restricted to adversative and concessive sequences, 
it can also be realized by preferential or antithetic constructions. Excerpt (3), which is 
ffom the same mediation session as excerpt (2), is an instance of a preferential contrast. 
The proponent had strongly complained that her opponent’s children were rude. In 
turn, the Opponent reproaches the proponent to slander her children in front o f her 
neighbours.
(3) frech [Mediation; IDS-Mannheim ‘Schlichtung’ 3001/02]
01 Opp: gege meine kinner lass isch mer net rumhetze. 
J won't have anyone slandering my children.
02 (-)
03 Pro: sie hawwe e freschs mädl des wisse sie 
you have an insolent girl you know that
04 ge!NAU! 
very well
05 Opp: ifALLE! kinner sin fresch. (.) 
all children are insolent. (.)
06 liewer hab isch e fresches kind wie e krankes 
I'd rather have an insolent child than a sick
07 kind.
child.
Excerpt (3) contains two corrective contrasts. The first one is:
*
03 ++ Pro: sie hawwe e freschs mädl des wisse sie
you have an insolent girl you know that
04 ge!NAU! 
very well
05 -»• Opp: If ALLE! kinner sin fresch. (.)
all children are insolent. (.)
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The Opponent counters the proponent’s reproach by despecifying the semantics of 
frech  (‘insolent’). The Opponent does not deny the proponent’s assertion regarding 
her children, but she refiises its moral import as a reproach. She does so by choosing a 
contrasting referential set (‘your girP vs. ‘all children’) to which she applies the epithet 
frech (‘insolent’). While the proponent categorizes the opponent’s child as a member 
of the subset of insolent children (which implicitly are opposed to well-bred children), 
the Opponent categorizes all children as insolent. Since her formulation eliminates the 
alternative set of ‘well-bred children) which the proponent made relevant by singling 
out the opponent’s daughter, the categorization frech  loses its distinctive moral se-
mantics and maybe also its distinctive descriptive power. The contrastive widening of 
the (locally relevant) extension of frech thus operates as a semantic correction of the 
proponent’s semantics of frech. The correction does not only affect the denotational, 
but also the moral meaning of the word. It should be noted that in this case the con-
trast does not alter the meaning of the contrasted words itself: The quantificational 
contrast8 between ‘you have an insolent giiT and ‘all children are insolent’ instead 
indirectly affects the meaning of the word frech which the contrasted quantities are 
attributed to. So, part of its meaning is altered by its collocational context, i.e. by the 
attribution of frech  to referential sets which contrast in quantity (i.e. ‘one’ vs. ‘all’).
In the same argument sequence, the Opponent uses a second contrast to elaborate 
further on the revaluation of frech ( ‘insolent’):
03 ++ S1: sie hawwe e freschs mädl des wisse sie
you have an insolent girl you know that
04 ge'.HAU!
very well
05 ++ S2: IfALLE! kinner sin fresch. (.)
’fALL! children are insolent. (.)
06 -» S2: liewer hab isch e fresches kind wie e krankes
I'd rather have an insolent child than a sick
07 kind.
child.
As she tries to keep up her countering position, the Opponent, in line 6, resumes the 
proponent’s categorization of her child as frech  and establishes a preferential contrast 
between/rec/j and krank (‘sick’) with respect to her child. In traditional semantic terms, 
both predicates would not be regarded as mutually exclusive, but as causally, logi- 
cally, and semantically unrelated. Consequently, the attribution of one o f them to a 
referent would neither preclude nor project the applicability o f the other to the same 
referent. The preferential contrast, however, does not only express a preference for 
frech  ( ‘insolent’) over krank (‘sick’). It suggests an alternative or even the need for a 
choice between the two States ‘having an insolent child’ and ‘having a sick child’: Both 
words are constructed as a locally relevant set o f complementaries. Now, contrasted 
with krank (‘sick’), frech  (‘insolent’) obtains a positive semantics, because the contrast 
highlights possibly relevant interpretations, such as ‘vivid’, ‘healthy’, ‘self-reliant’. These 
interpretations were not available in the proponent’s original context in line 1 , where
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frech  was the upshot of her reproach that the Opponent had failed to raise her children 
properly. In sum, we can trace a passage of the alteration and revaluation of the se- 
mantics of frech  in this sequence. It proceeds by three steps, all of which crucially rely 
on contrast structures:
a. S1 (line 3): frech is used derogatively and is distinctively attributed to the oppo- 
nent’s daughter; it means ‘bad mannered, not well-bred’;
b. S2 (line 5): frech  is contrastively attributed to children in general; this accomplishes 
a semantic despecifkation by extensional widening and gives frech a morally in-
different value;
c. S2 (line 6): frech is contrastively preferred over krank (‘siclc’)■, frech obtains a posi-
tive valuation and means ‘vivid, healthy, self-reliant etc.’.
4.2 Inferential bases and interactive functions of the corrective contrast
All cases of corrective contrast we have considered involve a disagreement between 
the participants on the local adequacy of a formulation as a descriptive device. In 
most cases, prior Speaker uses the formulation as adequate from his/her point of view. 
Next Speaker then corrects the semantics of the word, because in his/her opinion, prior 
Speaker implied a specific meaning, which s/he expresses by the contrast. Next Speaker 
judges this implicit meaning, which s/he attributes to prior speaker’s use of the for-
mulation, as locally inadequate. Therefore s/he refuses the use of the formulation in 
the way the prior Speaker did. The contrast thus rests on inferential reasoning which, 
schematically, runs as follows:
Sl: formulation is adequate;
S2: formulation as used by S l is not adequate,
because formulation as used by S l implies a meaning which is not ade-
quate,9
This inferential structure is essentially argumentative: Next Speaker treats the inad- 
equacy of the inference which s/he draws from prior speaker’s use of the word as a 
reason for the refusal of prior speaker’s interpretation.
Corrective contrasts are used to express disaffiliation with a prior speaker’s cate- 
gorization by indicating an account for the disaffiliation. The corrective contrast is a 
reflexive move, because it accomplishes an activity -  a disaffiliating turn -  by simulta- 
neously providing grounds for that activity. Corrective contrasts are most prominently 
used as a means of making disaffiliation accountable by performing a self-explicating 
disaffiliative action. They may but need not be followed by further explanations or 
clarifications (excerpt (1) is an example). Corrective contrasts not only oppose a prior 
turn, but they offer an alternative formulation. Therefore, they do not only decline a 
projected course of action, but suggest an alternative, or they point to a problem which 
has to be solved before the previously established joint project can be pursued further.
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This repair-like and reflexive character makes them a potentially productive means of 
managing interactional disalignment and lack of intersubjectivity.
5. Explicative contrast: Warranting a deviation categorization
Corrective contrasts are achieved by a next Speaker relating back to a prior speaker’s 
turn. Other practices o f contrasting are accomplished by only one Speaker. One of 
them are explicative contrasts. In an explicative contrast, a contrast between two words 
or phrases is used to explain the local meaning of a third word or phrase and to warrant 
the relevance and adequacy of the categorization which is accomplished by the use of 
the third word. Here is an example from a conversation among adolescents. Before 
excerpt (4) Starts, Denis had just told a story about a boy called Vito, who tries to take 
advantage o f others. Now Bernd produces a second story about Vito that aligns with 
the upshot of the first: Vito is greedy and exploits his friends.10
(4) für geld (Youth hostel)
01 DC Be: das is mal widder TYPisch vito für 
that Is TYPical of vito for money.
geld
02 da hätt isch ihn eigentlich wieder 
I would JUST have him. ( - - )
GRAD
03 ROsenmontag ja? (.)
MONday before lent right? ( . )
04 erzählt er uns die ganze zeit- (.) 
he teils all of us again and again-- (■)
05 das hat er FÜNF mal gesagt 
he has said that FIVE times
06 wie GEIL man mit denen- (.) 
how FAT you can- ( . )
07 ++ ähm guten PARty machen kann; (.) 
erm have a good PARty with them; ( ■ )
08 Fr: ja. 
yes.
09 —y Be: und dann Rippt er die voll ab. 
and then he really RIPS them off.
10 Fr: darauf hab isch 
also last time I
1 1 [ihn auch das letzte mal drauf 
[talked to him about that
12 De: [was hat er denn gemacht? 
[what did he do then?
13 Fr: [angesprochen. 
[last time.
14 —> Be: [Rippt er die voll ab. (-)
[he really RIPS them off. (-)
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15 ehy das war so hart.
aye it was so hard.
In line 1, Bernd formulates the upshot o f the preceding story by categorizing Vito as 
fü r geld, meaning ‘(greedy) for money’. Bernd then produces a second story fragment 
that consists o f two contrasting action descriptions: Vito offen claimed that he had a 
good party with some other boys (guten party m achen , line 7), whereas later he ripped 
them off (rippt ab, line 9 ).11 The contrast provides for the upshot o f the story fragment 
and is commented with indignation by Frank and Denis (lines 10-13).
Sequentially, the contrast is delivered as a warrant and simultaneously as a lo-
cal semantic clarification of the initial categorization fü r  geld in line 1. The basic 
schema is thus:
S l: deviation categorization is warranted and semantically explained by 
FO but CO
5.1 The deviation categorization and the contrast as display o f the violation
o f an expectation
There is a systematic asymmetry between the two categorizations which are co-selected 
to construct this type of contrast. The first categorization (here: ‘have a party’) is pos-
itive. This is made clear by explicit positive evaluations (guten (‘good’), GEIL (‘fat’)). 
Having a party with someone establishes a scenario of shared fun, common activity, 
and solidarity. The second categorization rippt ab  ( ‘rips off’) is negative. It is, however, 
not only intrinsically negative, but what is more interesting, in its sequential environ- 
ment it is specifically to be heard as a violation of an expectation or a norm that was 
established by the preceding categorization: to rip the people off with whom you have 
a party does not fit the scenario of togetherness and solidarity. Bernd’s and Franlc’s 
indignated comments and repetitions seem precisely to be directed at this violation of 
a social norm.
The contrasting action descriptions, thus, are a warrant for the relevance and for 
the adequacy of the initial categorization/ör geld (‘greedy for money’, line 1): Someone 
who acts inconsistently like this is aptly categorized as being ‘greedy for money’. It 
belongs to a type of category I will refer to as ‘deviation-categorization’. By a deviation- 
categorization the Speaker indicates that a referent violates a norm or frustrates an 
expectation that is currently relevant. Deviation categories most importantly include 
social categories. Examples are nouns such as ‘poser’ (see excerpt (5)), ‘exploiter’, ‘Her’ 
and their verbal and adjectival variants (cf. Smith 1978: ‘mentally ill’). Other deviation 
categories such as ‘broken’ (excerpt (8)), ‘rancid’ or ‘old-fashioned’ denote objects or 
abstract entities.
The contrast, however, is not only presented as a warrant. It also functions as a 
semantic clarification of the local meaning of the deviation-categorization: The con-
trast instructs the hearer how to specifically interpret the deviation-categorization in
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its interactional environment. TypicaUy, the contrast provides for a referential or ex- 
tensional specification by describing contrasting actions, States of affair or properties. 
This specification is often accomplished by some narrative structure which orders the 
contrasting actions (etc.) in a sequence. As the contrast is a subset of possible contrasts 
which could serve as a warrant for the deviation-categorization, it does not just specify 
its reference. It also rules out intensional aspects which the word or phrase may have 
in other contexts, but does not have in its current use. E.g., ‘greedy for money’ could 
imply that a person thus categorized tries to deceive others in order to get their money; 
this, however, is an interpretation which is not made relevant (although not necessarily 
excluded) by the explicative contrast in (4).
The following cases provide further examples of the semantic effects and the uses 
of explicative contrasts. Excerpt (5) is from an interaction among adolescents. Denis 
and Chris talk about another peer-group member (Markus) who had just been ‘dissed’,
i.e. (more or less) playfully insulted by a peer (cf. Deppermann & Schmidt 2001). Denis 
and Chris ridicule Markus as a poser (‘poser’, line 1), i.e. someone who pretends to be 
cool and unaffected by being ‘dissed’.
(5) poser (Youth center)
01 DC Chr: its its (.) jetzt is er wieder de POser heha; 
now now ( .) now he 's the poser again hehe;
02 Den: =kuck ma de markus der sitzt dahinten,(-) 
=uh look at markus sitting over there,( - )
03 der sitzt <<all> im=moment> grad da-(.) 
at the moment he's sitting there just- ( . )
04 wie SUleyman oder so, {.) 
like suleyman or so, ( . )
05 SS: ((laughter))
06 Fab: <<meckerndes Lachen> hehehehehe> 
<<bleating laughter> hahahahaha>
07 ? ; [=<<dim> schei:ße;> 
[= shi: t;
08 Chr: [=<<all> de su:leyman immer im Wohnwagen ne? 
[= sutleyman always in the caravan uh? (,)
09 und wie der gemeint hat-(-) 
and how he claimed- ( - )
10 + + ich verTRA:G fünf [beer, ]> (.)
I can take five [beers,]> ( . )
11 9 ; [äh? ] 
[ah? ]
12 Chr: <<meckerndes Lachen> hehehA,> (-) 
«bleating laughter> hahahu,> (-)
13 —>• und deNACH im Wohnwagen lag und=n.
and then he lay down in the caravan.
Denis takes a first step of the elaboration of the local semantics o f the deviation catego-
rization poser by comparing Markus to another member of the peer-group, Suleyman.
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He is a peripheral, low-status member of the peer-group and is regarded as a brag- 
gard. He is thus introduced with a metonymic specification of poser. Starting with 
line 8, Chris confirms this analogy by telling an episode which attests to Suleyman 
being a poser. He claimed to be able to take five beers (vertrag fü n f bier, line 10), 
which would be a display of masculinity. This announcement contrasts sharply with 
the outcome of the consumption: Suleyman lay down in the caravan (lag und=n, line 
13), that is, he was “too weak”. This result frustrates the expectation which Suley- 
man’s commissive announcement had established, and so the sequence warrants the 
deviation-categorization poser. Since the contrast of claim and reality refers to Suley-
man, it is an explication of poser -  which refers to Markus -  by way of an evocative 
analogy. It highlights semantic aspects such as ‘bragging’, ‘weakness’, ‘incredible and 
easy to be discovered façade’. Interpretations of poser that would be salient in other 
contexts are not supported (such as ‘type of heavy-metal freald, ‘overdressed’).
In excerpt (6), a contrast is constructed in order to account for two different 
deviation-categorizations, The segment is from a biographical research interview. The 
interviewee talks about how he feit when he came to West Germany (FRG) in the 1980s 
as an immigrant from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). He complains 
that he was rejected by his West German age-mates (‘here’) because of his clothing 
which did not comply with youth cultural fashion Standards.
(6) von einem anderen Stern (Biographical interview)
01 IE: un HIER war das natürlich ganz KRASS.
02
and here of course it was very blatant. 
als Ausländer, (.) 
as a foreigner, (.)
03 DC dann ANgezogen wie von einem anderen STERN.




IE: also ich bin mit SIEBziger JAHre 
I mean I wore
07
08
06 + + clogs rumgelaufen,(-)
clogs in a seventies style, (-) 
und das mit DREIzehn
and that being thirteen years old in 





IE: wo die Anderen schon langsam ANgefangen 




—s- haben MARken zu gucken. (-)
to look for brands. (-) 
und DIE:sei gab es damals noch nicht 
and diesel didn't exist then 
aber es war halt marco POlo oder, 






BEnetton oder marco P0:lo. (-) 
benetton or marco polo. (-) 
also ich habe BILder von mir gesehen 




I mean- (.) hh
19 IR: ((laughs aloud))
20 IE: <<lachend> also ich verSTEH
«laughing> I mean I understand
21 DC dass sie mich AUSgegrenzt haben.>
that they excluded me.>
In line 3, the interviewee describes his former dress as like from another planet (ange-
zogen wie von einem anderen stern). This is a visual metaphor for deviation. In what 
follows, he clarifies this categorization by saying that he wore clogs (lines 5f.), which 
was an old-fashioned style (siebziger jahre, ‘seventies style’) at that time. He contrasts 
this with the preference for marken (‘brands’, line l l f .) ,  that is, with clothing made 
by youth-culturally valued producers which adolescents in Germany preferred at that 
time (neunzehnhundertfünfundachtzig, ‘1985’, line 8). The contrast with respect to a 
set of categories for clothing (‘clogs’ vs. ‘brands’) thus is co-selected with a contrast 
of temporal categories (‘seventies’ vs. ‘1985’). In contradistinction to excerpts (4), (5) 
and (7), however, the explicative contrast does not rest on a temporal ordering of con-
trasted events or actions. Here, it is a majority norm which is established by marken 
(‘brands’) and frustrated by clogs. This frustration provides for a comic incongruence 
which is acknowledged by the story recipient’s laughter (line 9). After the interviewee 
has collaborated with the interviewer in producing examples for brands, he concludes 
that this contrast was a sufficient reason for Western German boys to exclude him (aus-
gegrenzt, line 21). The two deviation-categorizations stand in different relations to the 
explicative contrast:
a. The contrast provides for an extensional and metonymic semantic clarification 
of the initial deviation-categorization angezogen wie von einem anderen stern 
( ‘dressed like from another planet’, line 1). This formulaic and metaphorical de- 
scription is explicated by the contrast of prototypical items (clogs) or properties 
(brands) which stand metonymically for conflicting styles of dressing.
b. The concluding deviation-categorization ausgegrenzt (‘excluded’, line 21) is not 
semantically explicated by the contrast:12 It does not provide a specification as 
to how, where and when exclusion was done and what kind of exclusion is 
meant. The contrast, however, provides a reason for the activity o f excluding. So, 
the contrast does not explain the categorization ausgegrenzt ( ‘excluded’). Rather, 
it enhances its intelligibility, but only in an argumentative, not in a semantic, 
dimension.
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5.2 Projection and restriction o f the interpretation of the contrast by a prior
deviation-categorization
Explicative contrasts are not only employed to warrant the deviation-categorization. 
Simultaneously, they specify its local semantic interpretation. In the cases presented, 
the deviation-category itself is introduced prior to the contrast. However, there 
are also cases in which a deviation category is presented as a concluding upshot 
(cf. (6)), and cases in which the contrast is designed to suggest an inference to a 
deviation-categorization which is not explicitly formulated. The practice o f warrant- 
ing a deviation-categorization is always accomplished by one Speaker in a multi-unit 
turn, which is often projected from its outset. The contrast can therefore be said to 
be often planned in advance as a narrative device.13 It is primarily used as a building 
block of other genres that are at the same time descriptive and morally implicative, 
such as gossiping, blaming, or complaining. Wliile the contrast provides for the de-
scriptive core o f States, events or actions that warrant a deviation-categorization, the 
deviation-categorization itself is presented as its moral upshot in the story preface or 
in its conclusion. When it is used in a preface which calls for further narrative elab- 
oration, it projects the kind of violations, problems etc. to be told and which the 
contrast must be understood as being an instance of. The deviation-categorization 
thus acts as an interpretive restriction which constrains the possible interpretation of 
the contrasted items.
For example, in (6), the deviation-categorization angezogen wie von einem an -
deren stem  ( ‘dressed like from another planet’, line 3) projects an explication of how 
the teller’s clothes differed from his age-mates. This projection also constrains the in-
terpretation of clogs which is used for the teller’s own dress -  it is projected as being 
peculiar, negatively valued and inadequate. If the Speaker had formulated another pref-
ace, clogs could also have been interpreted as reflecting innovation, individuality or 
health orientation as compared to marken (‘brands’).
In (5), the deviation-categorization poser (line 1), constrains the interpretation 
of the contrast, because it pre-establishes an explanation for the contrast between the 
announcement ich vertrag fü n f bier (T can take five beers’) and the result o f the con- 
sumption lag und=n (‘he lay down’). Given the initial categorization poser, the claim 
to be able to take five beers is clearly to be interpreted as bragging. This restriction 
would not necessarily be in order, if, e.g., the protagonist had been categorized as ‘ill’ 
in the outset.
Explicative contrasts thus serve as a (referential) explication of a deviation- 
categorization which itself acts as a constraint for the interpretation of the contrast. 
It does so because it either has an intrinsically contrastive semantics (such as ‘poser’, 
‘broken’), which makes contrast strongly expectable, or because it projects a problem, 
deviation, etc. Since the deviation-categorization and the contrasted categorizations 
constitute a local set o f categories which are to be understood as coherently co-selected, 
they reciprocally constrain and specify each other’s local interpretation. That is, the 
hearer will select the interpretations for each of them according to the supposition
3 07
that the contrasted items explicate the meaning of the deviation-categorization. The 
latter in turn restricts the possible interpretations o f the contrasted items.
5.3 Interactional functions o f the explicative contrast
Although explicative contrasts are realized by descriptions, they clearly have an argu-
mentative function and they carry intrinsic evaluations. As such, they differ from the 
contrasts that Ford (2000, 2001) studied: In her data, contrasts were treated as ob-
jects in need of explanation or solution. Just on the contrary, explicative contrasts 
serve as explanatíons for the use of a deviation-categorization which establishes a 
complaint etc. This is most obvious when a contrast is delivered only after a dis- 
affiliative hearer’s response to a deviation-categorization. In these cases the contrast 
is interactionally occasioned and not part of a planned explication of a deviation- 
categorization. Excerpt (7) is a case in question: A child complains that she cannot 
play the Computer game ‘Harry Potter’, because the Computer mouse is kaputt (‘bro- 
ken’, deviation-categorization in line 2). Her mother, however, does not align with this 
assertion and seems to account for the trouble by the child’s incompetence to handle 
the Computer correctly: She suggests that the child asks a classmate how to play the 
game. In lines 8-9 , the child insists on her initial categorization kaputt (‘broken’) by 
warranting it with the contrast between her knowledge about the correct handling of 
the Computer and her lack o f success.
(7) kaputt (Dinner table conversation)
01 Ch: das harry potter spiel GE.-HT wieder NICHT. (.)
the harry potter game again does not work. (.)
02 DC IMmer- (-) immer ist die MAU:S kaPUTT. (.) 
always- (-) always the mouse is broken. (.)
03 Mo: du kannst doch den A- (.) ANdy anRUFen; (-) 
you can call up A- (.) Andy; (-)
04 der hat dir doch SCHON mal erklärt
06
05
he already once explained to you
WIE das geht. (.)
how it works. (. )
der weiß es be[STIMMT.
he knows [for sure.





08 ++ ic h  WEIß wie es geht- (.)
I know how it works- (.)
< < a ll>  a b e r  es>  GE:sHT nicht. 
but it doesn't work.
( 1 , 0 )
j a : -  ( . )  dann kann ma n ic h t s  machen. 
well- (.) then you can't do anything.
o8
In excerpt (7), there is an interesting fusion of argumentative and semantic con- 
cerns which points to the moral implicativity and possibly intrinsic argumentative 
semantics of deviation-categorizations. The child had first warranted her deviation- 
categorization kaputt (‘broken’, line 2) by only referring to the fact that the Computer 
did not work (line 1). The mother’s disaffiliative uptake (lines 3-6) points to the fact 
that a Computer does not work may depend on other causes, such as wrong han- 
dling. Consequently, the child uses the contrast between correct handling (implicated 
by ich WEIß wie es geht, T know how it works’, line 8) and (unexpected) malfunc- 
tion (GEHT nicht, ‘doesn’t work’, line 9) as a refined warrant which is designed to 
counter the mother’s objection because it denies incorrect handling as the cause for 
the malfunction of the Computer. The child makes it explicit that kaputt (‘broken’) 
has an argumentative meaning: Its assertive use does not only state the observation 
about a state o f affairs (‘something doesn’t work’), but it additionally requires a di- 
agnosis o f an internal cause for this state (‘something doesn’t work because o f an 
internal defect’). Although this internal cause is not explicitly asserted, it is strongly 
implicated by the child’s denial of wrong handling which I see as the only contextually 
salient alternative explanation. The semantic explication therefore serves as an argu-
mentative account and simultaneously points to the causal semantic structure o f the 
deviation-categorization kaputt (‘broken’): It not only diagnoses a functional state, but 
also locates the cause for this state in the object it is attributed to.
To fulfill the function ofwarranting the deviation-categorization, it is most impor-
tant to select and combine facts in exactly the way the contrast does: One part of the 
contrast would not be sufficient, and the function of the contrast would be blocked, if 
the Speaker left open the possibility o f further facts that could provide for a normal- 
izing account of the contrasting facts.14 So, the explanatory or argumentative value of 
the contrast needs to be plausible and obvious for its recipients, and the Speaker has to 
take care not to provide for additional descriptions which could serve as a competing 
explanation that in turn would undermine the deviation-categorization.
6. Two general interpretive strategies for contrast structures
Sections 4 and 5 discussed the specific sequential, functional and semantic proper- 
ties o f two practices o f contrasting and their impacts on the local interpretation of 
the words or phrases from which the contrast is built. Still, we have not yet addressed 
another main issue: How can participants understand words to be local opposites, al-
though there is no common lexical paradigm they are part of? In what follows, I will 
claim that there are two general strategies for the interpretation of the contrasted items. 
These are frame-based interpretation and maximization of contrast. These two strate-
gies help to provide the contrasted items with an oppositional meaning, which also 
specifies their local interpretation in a more comprehensive sense. The use o f these two 
strategies is pervasive with any kind of discursive contrast and seems to be independent 
of the specific practice of contrasting.
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6 .i Frame-based interpretation
Only in some cases o f antithesis, discursive contrasts are made up of items which stand 
to each other in a lexical Opposition in the traditional sense (like ‘hot’ vs. ‘cold’, ‘come’ 
vs. lgo’ etc.). In most cases, there is a pragmatic Opposition within a frame:15 The first 
item contextualizes a frame of associated expectations which are violated by the con-
trasted second item. These expectations are systematically tied to the category which is 
locally made relevant by the first item. The discursive contrast introduces a fact which 
violates or frustrates some o f the expectations that are locally operative because o f the 
first categorization. There are different kinds of expectations which can be frustrated 
by the contrast.
a. There may be a violation of social norms, such as the violation of an expectation of 
solidarity and reciprocity in (4), or the deviation from Standards of fashion in (6).
b. There may be a violation of causal consequences that can be expected given the 
antecedents stated. In (2), the action of throwing stones made expectable that they 
reach their target; however, they did not. Another example o f a causal expectation 
is (7): the correct handling of a device allows for the expectation that the device 
will work, but here it does not.
In all of these cases, the contrasted words or phrases are not opposed to one another 
“as such”, but with regard to social, instrumental, causal etc. regularities that are con- 
textualized to be locally operative. These background expectations are constitutive of 
the existence and the intelligibility of the contrast. If  they are neither shared nor recov- 
erable, a contrast will not arise for the hearer. Many contrasts are located in temporally 
ordered frames, i.e. Scripts (Schank & Abelson 1977), which represent a normal course 
o f action or process. This is the case in (2), (4), (5), (7): the first part of the contrast 
describes an action or a state o f affairs that makes strongly expectable a future state or 
action which is not realized by the second part. So, there is often a second axis of co- 
selection, namely a temporal axis, which systematically combines a temporal sequence 
o f events with the co-selected contrasting items.
Frame-based interpretation does not only provide for the pragmatic Opposition 
between the contrasted categorizations. It also supplies the background knowledge 
which is necessary to bridge a gap between the facts expressed by the first categoriza-
tion and those which the contrasting second one represents. For example, in (7), the 
contrast between ich weiß wie es geht (Tknow how it works’, line 8) and es geht nicht (‘it 
doesn’t work’, line 9) needs the bridging assumption (Clark 8c Haviland 1977) that the 
Speaker not only knew how to handle the Computer correctly, but that she actually did 
so. Only on this condition, the failure of the Computer to work correctly is a relevant 
frustration of the expectation contextualized by ‘I know how it works’. In such cases, 
the tacit reconstruction and acceptance of such assumptions is decisive for recognizing 
a contrast. It would not arise, if they were denied or if a competing explanation for the 
co-occurrence of the first and the second categorization was proposed.
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The background knowledge which is required to grasp the contrasting interpre- 
tations can be culturally specific. In (3), line 6, the preferential contrast between frech  
(‘insolent’) and krank (‘sick’) relies on a folk psychological theory. It says that a child 
will become sick if  exposed to a restrictive education which (only) aims at prevent- 
ing the child from being insolent. This folk theory has it that there is a conditional 
and genetic relation between frech (‘insolent’) and krank (‘sick’): I f  a child is not al- 
lowed to be insolent, then it will become sick. The folk theory gives an account for 
the systematics o f why and how frech  and krank are contrastively related to one an-
other. This account cannot be gleaned from the interactional sequence itself, it must 
be supplied by the hearer in order to reconstruct its coherence. Moreover, appeal to 
this background knowledge is necessary in order to select the right semantic interpre-
tation for the contrasted items. In the context of their contrast and on the basis of the 
folk psychological theory,
a. frech means ‘vivid, clever, self-reliant etc.’ -  and not ‘disobedient’, ‘uneducated’, or 
‘rude’ which was its locally relevant semantics, when frech  was used before by the 
p rior Speaker in line 1 in the same extract;
b. krank here has to be specified as ‘psychologically ill’ -  and not ‘physically ill’, ‘lying 
in bed’ or ‘insane’ which it can mean in other contexts.
Another example of how interpretations of contrasted items might depend on a com- 
plex frame is (6). Clogs (line 6) and marken (‘brands’, line 11) do not routinely make up 
a contrast because any clog can have a brand as its property.16 Here, however, wearing 
clogs is contrasted with wearing brands. Together with the information given about 
historical and cultural context (‘1985’, line 8; adolescents in West Germany, lines 1 -  
2, 10- 11 ), the recípíent can construct a frame of youth-cultural fashion preferences, 
which allows to fix the local interpretation of clogs and marken (‘brands’):
a. ‘Brands’ occupy the slot of fashionable objects or product-properties. They do 
not denote a formal product-property which just any brand would be an instance 
of. Instead, the hearer is forced to construct an autohyponymous interpretation: 
marken  here specifically means ‘prestigious in-brands’. This autohyponymous in-
terpretation is further clarified by the examples o f relevant brands (diesel, benetton, 
marco polo), which the participants collaboratively construct in lines 12-16.
b. With respect to the frame of youth-cultural fashion preferences, clogs are not 
only out of fashion, but further specified as old-fashioned (siebziger jahre, ‘sev- 
enties’, line 5). Clogs can thus be understood as a metonym for ‘old-fashioned 
clothing’ and as carrying some additional, more vaguely associated features lilce 
‘poor’, ‘ugly’, ‘uninformed’. Interpretations o f clogs appropriate to other contexts 
are irrelevant (‘healthy’), or at least defocused (‘kind of shoe’).
These examples show that the local interpretation of words in conversation can es- 
sentially depend on ethnographic, historical and other cultural knowledge. Its rele- 
vance may be contextualized by linguistic cues with varying degrees of definiteness (cf. 
Gumperz 1982).
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In sum, the inference to a frame is essential for the reconstruction of the lo-
cal semantics o f the contrasted items. Background knowledge is required in order
to understand how and why the second part is pragmatically opposed to the first. 
Specifically, a frame can
a. be contextualized by one part o f the contrast and involve an expectation that is 
frustrated by the other part,
b. supply bridging assumptions that are necessary to conceive of the elements con-
trasted as being systematically and contrastively related,
c. relate both parts o f the contrast to each other in an explanatory structure,
d. consist o f background knowledge that is generally operative for (a Stretch of) a 
conversation and that informs the participants’ situated reasoning on which the 
local semantics o f the contrasted items may rely.
6.2 Maximization o f contrast
Although background knowledge constrains and suggests possible interpretations of 
contrasted words or phrases, it is not sensitive to the particular fact that they are used 
as part of a contrast which the Speaker produces to be understood as such. So, in (3) 
the folk psychological theory can supply an explanation of how frech  (‘insolent’) and 
krank ( ‘sick’) might be genetically related to each other (see Section 6.1), but it does 
not necessarily fix an opposing interpretation of the items. Rather, it seems that the 
hearer must first recognize the speaker’s intention to construct a maximally contrast-
ing interpretation of the items. Maximization of contrast in this case involves several 
dimensions of meaning:
a. an antonymic evaluation: frech  (‘insolent’) is positively valued, krank (‘sick’) neg- 
atively;
b. the supposition of incompatibility or even complementarity: ‘insolent’ seems to 
imply ‘not sick’, ‘not insolent’ seems to imply ‘sick’; maybe the Speaker even implies 
that a bi-conditional relation holds, i.e., being ‘insolent’ and being ‘not sick’ imply 
one another;
c. it establishes a negative causal link between the categorizations;
d. it instructs the search for interpretations o f both items which maximize such se-
mantic aspects that can be understood as being opposed to each other, such as 
frech  implies ‘healthy’, while krank implies ‘inactive’.
‘Maximization’ thus means that the hearer is instructed to watch out for and adopt 
contrasting aspects of meaning as part of the locally relevant interpretation of the con-
trasted items, while possibly common or unrelated aspects o f meaning are defocused 
as currently irrelevant or even as locally invalid. Frech (‘insolent’) vs. krank ( ‘sick’), for 
instance, could in other contexts both be evaluated as negative characteristics, which 
are dispreferred and should be fought by parents, and they could even be positively
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related to one another by a competing folk psychological theory that sees sickness as a 
just punishment for being insolent.17
Contrasted items affect one another reciprocally in their interpretation, i.e., their 
specific local interpretations mutually depend on each other.18 In fact, the hearer first 
needs to recognize that the Speaker intends to convey an asymmetric evaluative con-
trast in order to choose the right folk psychological frame within which s/he can 
interpret frech  and krank. If  s/he did not recognize that a contrast was intended, there 
may be quite different ways to relate the items to each other, and some of them would 
entail very different interpretations for them.
A similar reasoning that maximizes the contrast is necessary for a correct under- 
standing o f most o f the examples discussed, e.g.:
-  In (6), und=n liegen ('to lie down’) needs to be specified as 'loss of self-control and 
bad physical condition’, for this is exactly the opposite o f ‘unimpeded self-control 
and physical condition’ which was implied by the contrasting claim ich vertrag fü n f  
hier ( ‘I can take five beers’).
-  In (7), clogs and marken ( ‘brands’) have to be understood as polar antonyms with 
respect to a scale o f ‘being fashionable’. This in turn forces clogs into a metonymic 
interpretation and marken  into an autohyponymic sense (cf. Section 6.1).
In general, we can posit a ‘maxim of the maximization of contrast’: If the hearer rec- 
ognizes that the Speaker intends to contrast two words, then s/he interprets them so 
as to maximize their contrast in meaning. I will briefly comment on parts o f this 
formulation:
The reference to the recognition of the speaker’s intention is most central because 
it instructs the hearer to look for cues that can be used to constitute or contextualize 
a contrast.19 Once this intention is recognized, the hearer will not only recognize that 
the contrasted items somehow do not fit together, but s/he realizes that they are sys- 
tematically co-selected in order to convey a deliberate contrast to an expectation. The 
instruction to maximize the contrast implies that the hearer should maximize the ways 
in which they are contrastively relevant to each other. This involves that the contrasted 
words or phrases are related to one another with respect to a common frame, that the 
hearer actively looks for motivational, instrumental, causal etc. links which can explain 
the co-occurrence of the contrasted States, and that s/he does not assume the existence 
of unstated facts which would eliminate the contrast. Finally, the appeal to maximize 
the contrast in meaning instructs the hearer to look for common semantic dimensions 
on which the two items can be located as inhabiting opposing (polar, complementary 
etc.) positions. This preference for maximizing contrasts in meaning is reflected by the 
fact that the contrasting items are routinely associated with an asymmetric evaluation, 
that is, if contextually suitable, one of them is interpreted as being positive, the other 
as being negative.
The maxim guides the selection, foregrounding and construction of local inter-
pretations for the contrasted items among the ränge of otherwise contextually and 
lexically possible interpretations. Other interpretations which would be possible, but
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which focus on common or unrelated semantic properties, are disfavoured. Instead, 
the maxim works as a heuristics which instructs the hearer to construct new mean- 
ings that have not been associated before with one of the words (phrases) or even 
both of them.
The maxim of maximizing the contrast is reminiscent o f Sacks’ (1972) hearer’s 
maxim for the co-selection of categorizations. Sacks’ maxim instructs the hearer to in- 
terpret subsequent categorizations consistently as belonging to the same membership 
categorization device (MCD) as a first one (ifpossible). Sacks’ maxim has a number of 
interpretive consequences that parallel those of the maxim of maximizing the contrast, 
namely, the maximization of coherence between categorizations, the supposition of a 
systematic choice by the Speaker and the incorporation into a common frame.20
The maxim of the maximization of the contrast is also a corollary of the second 
Gricean maxim of quantity: “Don’t malte your contribution more informative than is 
required” (Grice 1975) in its interpretation by Levinson (2000:112ff.), who calls it the 
“Principie of Informativeness”. It instructs the hearer to interpret an utterance as spe-
cific as possible, that is, as maximally fulfilling the speaker’s communicative intention 
as reconstructed by the hearer. This principie maltes the hearer suppose that stereotyp- 
ical, ffame-based ltnowledge can be used in order to amend, enrich, disambiguate, and 
connect the speaker’s descriptions in order to maximize coherence. It also suggests that 
there are no unstated facts which would thwart the reconstructed intentional upshot.
7 . Conclusion
Contrasting in conversation is not one homogeneous practice. In my paper, I have fo- 
cused on two variants that differ in their ways o f providing contrasted words with 
a specific local interpretation: Correcting a prior categorization and warranting a 
deviation-categorization. Furthermore, I have tried to show that there are two general 
strategies of interpreting contrasted lexical items as semantically contrasting needed 
in order to arrive at a contrastive local interpretation: Frame-based interpretation and 
maximization of contrast. These strategies are applied regardless of the specific kind 
of practice by which the contrast is accomplished. Speakers use conversational activi-
ties and background knowledge to construct locally specific interpretations of lexical 
items. I tried to show that and -  at least in some basic ways -  how both sources of 
interpretation are needed and made relevant by each other in order to achieve local 
semantic interpretations.21 This study is thus an empirically backed plea for the inte- 
gration of conversation analytic and cognitive approaches in the study o f interactional 
linguistics, especially for concerns of semantics and meaning construction.
As to the relation of lexical and conversational structure, this study reveals that 
locally relevant semantic contrasts may be accomplished ad hoc by activities o f con-
trasting. Looking ahead, it also suggests that conversational contrasting may have its 
effects on lexical structure, at least in the long run: Lexical contrasts might ultimately 
rely on conversational contrasts that have been used routinely. A pervasive, repeated,
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routine use o f conversational contrasts may provide lexical items with an interpreta-
tion which becomes available “out o f context”, that is, independent o f the activity of 
contrasting.22 The lexical item may then be said to incorporate the meaning poten-
tial which was supplied by instances o f discursive contrasting as a salient possibility of 
interpretation, that is, it somehow absorbs its opposite as the relevant fr ame of inter-
pretation as a meaning potential. This can be used in other contexts without the need 
to be re-instated by manifest contrasts. Further studies on the history of the contrast-
ing use and the meaning of lexical items will be necessary to show whether this genetic 
hypothesis about semantic change holds. If it turns out to be right, the interactional 
linguistic claim that routine interactional activities petrify as linguistic structure would 
also be given a basis in the realm of semantics.
Notes
* I thank Peter Auer, Dagmar Barth-Weingarten, Auli Hakulinen and Margret Selting for valu- 
able comments on an earlier Version of this paper.
1. Sweetser (1990) also States these two shortcomings of structuralist semantics from a 
co g n itiv e -p rag m atic  viewpoint.
2. In most of the following examples the participants use Southern German dialects. For the 
transcription conventions used here see Selting et al. (1998).
3. In the transcripts, first parts of contrasting formulations are marked by ++, while second 
parts are indicated by arrows (-> ).
4. The vagueness of “adequacy” is intentional, because there may be very different matters at 
issue, such as truth, evaluation, applicability, precision of prior speaker’s formulation.
5. Excerpts (2) and (3) are data from the corpus “Schlichtungsgespräche” (‘Mediation sessions’) 
ofthe Institut für Deutsche Sprache (Institute for German Language, Mannheim/Germany).
6. The German verbs werfen und schmeißen are denotationally perfectly synonymous when 
used as a predicate taking the direct object stein (‘stone’). The use of schmeißen, however, is 
restricted to orality. It may be that the reformulation of warf (line 5) as schmeißt (line 10) serves 
to adumbrate a semantic difference and thus is not merely a paraphrase. However, the semantic 
correction only becomes evident as the proponent negates the expected result of the action in 
line 12 .
7. The distinction between accomplishment- and activity-interpretation is made by Pustejovsky 
(1995:12).
8. Note that a contrastive accent is put most emphatically on IALLEI ( ‘all’), thus stressing the 
quantificational contrast.
9. The inferential structure is slightly different in the case of the preferential contrast frech (‘in-
solent’) vs. krank (‘sick’) in excerpt (3). Here, the participants do not disagree whether frech is an 
adequate attribution to the opponent’s daughter. Rather, they disagree on its evaluation: While 
the proponent evaluates/rec/j negatively, the Opponent uses the contrast with krank to point to 
the inference that frech has to be evaluated positively.
10. The deviation categorization is indicated by ‘DC’ in the transcripts.
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11. It turns out later that this refers to the fact that Vito consumed large quantities of the other 
boys’ drugs.
12. It is only explained later in the interview.
13. I found only one case in which a contrast warranting a deviation-categorization was pro- 
duced by two Speakers. However, in that specific case, the second Speaker was only bringing out 
a contrast in the clear that had already been adumbrated by the first Speaker. Such a case can be 
understood as an eminent display of shared knowledge and shared attitudes towards a person or 
an object.
14. This could be shown for all cases discussed. For instance, in (5), other causes than Suley- 
man’s consumption of beer may have made him lie down in the caravan; or in (7), the mouse 
might not have been branched correctly etc.
15. The notion ‘frame’ (Fillmore 1982, 1985; Barsalou 1992) is used here as a cover term that 
encompasses different models of knowledge structures which have been claimed to account for 
inferential processes of situated understanding. Among them are concepts like ‘frame’, ‘schema’, 
‘scenario’ and ‘script’. For the present concerns, differences in notation, internal structure, repre- 
sentational format, inferential procedures etc. between these models are of minor importance. It 
has to be noted, however, that frames here are not regarded as fixed knowledge structures which 
are invariably associated with a specific word. Rather, they are conceived of as context-dependent 
structures, which can be flexibly adapted to contextual information, may be reworked and con- 
structed on the spot (cf. Barsalou 1992) and are subject to processes of spreading activation 
(Herrmann etal. 1996).
16. In a representation of the standard-meaning of clogs, ‘brand’ would be an ‘is a’-slot, which 
would be instantiated differently for clogs from different producers.
17. Moreover, to be insolent can be considered as a kind of social illness, or physically sick 
children can be said to be less insolent, etc.
18. This is different with cases like (2), where nicht getrojfe ( ‘did not hit’) does affect schmeißt 
(‘throws’), but in turn is not affected by the latter.
19. This should not be mistaken as a plea for a mentalist stance of analysis or even as a supposi- 
tion that the hearer could inspect the speaker’s intentions. The emphasis on the requirement to 
recognize the speaker’s intention points to the fact that the hearer needs to ascribe an intention 
to the Speaker in order to understand his/her turns as intelligible and purposive contributions 
to a conversation and that s/he does so by interpreting the speaker’s public activities in terms of 
intentional actions.
20. The notion of ‘MCD’ can be accomodated to the concept of ‘frame’. In its collection-like, 
taxonomic and paradigmatic character, however, it is more restricted than other kinds of frames, 
which also allow for causal, instrumental, moral, rational, etc. links between their elements 
and which explicitly focus on the inferential (default-)reasoning connections between their 
elements.
21. In fact, “activities” cannot be recognized as such without bringing relevant background 
knowledge to the fore, whereas the relevant knowledge needs to be cued and validated by 
ongoing conversational activities.
22. The interpretation offrech (‘insolent’) seems to be a case in question: Its Opposition to krank 
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